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Why This Discussion Now7
This essay was first written on the morning of January 15,1991, it has 
undergone only minor changes since Why should anyone write another 
analysis of American policy in the Persian Gulf after all the decisions had 
been taken, every viewpoint had been aired, Congress had debated and voted, 
diplomacy had failed, and war was just about to begin7 Why, especially a 
private citizen, with no responsibility for any decision, no particular forum 
for which to write, and no special audience to address7
Partly as catharsis, an acquittal of conscience, a symbolic gesture But 
also, and mainly, out of a feeling that not everything had been said and 
considered, and that what was omitted needed saying, especially during the 
war One thing largely missing from the debate, was the perspective of 
history Not, of course, some kinds and pieces of history On the immediate 
history of this crisis there was plenty, plenty also, probably too much, of 
historical analogies between Saddam and Hitler, or the present situation and 
Munich or Vietnam, but very little serious analysis of this crisis in terms of 
the broad history of international politics in recent decades and centuries In 
the debate over the immediate question, "What should we do right now7", 
other questions were drowned out 'Where do we and the world stand now 
in the light of history, recent and remote7 What kind of turning point is 
this7 What are its historic dangers and possibilities7 If history is any guide, 
where will the decisions and actions we take now be likely to lead m ten or 
twenty years time7
These questions are not only of interest to historians of international 
politics like myself They, and the possible answers to them, are relevant and 
important even after the decision for war is made and while war is going on 
For one thing, they concern its conduct and the character of the peace to 
follow For another (here I express a conviction impossible to demonstrate to 
skeptics, but one which long study of the history of international politics 
impresses on me), its history is not simply one of constant struggle for power 
and advantage, punctuated by frequent wars Along with that, it is also a 
record of a long, painful, costly, and uneven process of learmng—learning 
how to combine peace with reasonable security and some measure of justice, 
how to conceive of a viable international system, how to define and build a 
tolerable world order Whatever the root causes of war may be, one major 
problem of dealing with war is clearly one of know-how how to manage 
international politics under the structural conditions of the existence of many 
actors with conflicting, sometimes incompatible, purposes, rights, claims, and 
needs Constructing a viable international system is extremely difficult work, 
the hardest political task the nations of the world face Each generation faces 
it anew, with some accumulated wisdom and technique, and even more
2accumulateci ignorance and prejudice, and must somehow build on the one 
and overcome the other The learning process always works imperfectly, and 
sometimes breaks down disastrously, but it must and does go on
This essay has a purpose, therefore, even though it can make no 
difference in immediate events If the conduct of international politics finally 
involves collective learning, then someone who has reason to believe that he 
or she sees where a wrong turn is being taken has a kind of duty to say so If 
that person is wrong, no great harm will be done except to his/her reputation, 
and if right, it will contribute to the learning process
Where History has Brought Us
There are three great changes in international politics, the culminations of 
decades or centuries of development, that one can detect ripening in our age 1 
The first is the rise of the trading state 2 This means not merely the increasing 
preeminence of economic factors in international politics, but the fact that the 
long-term existence and success of states comes to depend more and more 
upon their efficiency in promoting commerce rather than their prowess and 
success in waging war In the 17th and 18th centuries, especially in Europe 
where our current international system originated, states were literally made 
by and for war Only by acquiring the permanent means for war, above all 
reliable revenues and a strong standing army or navy or both, could a state 
hope to survive and prosper, and the best way to acquire revenues and 
develop a military establishment was to wage war successfully In the late 
20th century, states are increasingly made by and for trade Without 
abandoning their power and security functions, they depend increasingly 
upon the promotion and protection of commerce for their internal stability 
and external influence Many examples could be cited—as successes, Japan, 
West Germany, Western Europe, many newly industrializing countries, as 
relative failures, the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Vietnam, and others
The second is closely connected the decline in the utility of military 
victory One might suppose that war has always been a bloody, costly, 
senseless business In a moral or religious sense, no doubt, but not in a 
supposedly "realistic' power-political one Until recent times, in European 
history till approximately the end of the 19th century, successful war usually 
paid off The winner could turn a handsome profit, not merely in honor, 
prestige, and territory, but often m terms of hard cash Many examples could 
be cited, the most recent in European history being the Franco-Prussian war of 
1870-1871, though some colonial wars were highly profitable well after that 
More than that, military victory in war could usually be thought of as 
genuinely solving problems, or at least solving them as much as 
international politics allowed a solution at all The only remedy available for
3countering aggression, gaming security, fulfilling vital interests, or achieving 
national self-determination was a successful war
In our time, as a consequence of many familiar developments (the 
exponential development of the costs and destructiveness of warfare, the 
increasing complexity and fragility of modem economic activity, the 
politization of the masses everywhere, the organization of the whole world 
into nominally independent states, the speed and pervasiveness of modern 
communications), war and military victory can no longer, in most cases, be 
seen as profitable, or, in themselves, an answer to problems This does not 
mean, of course, that military power and its use in war have become useless 
and absurd, an obsolete relic m history 3 Military power is still indispensable 
m international politics and inseparable from it, wars may still be necessary 
and justified, and military victory may still be required as a foundation for 
solving a critical problem Military victory was necessary to end both World 
Wars and try to solve the problems that had caused them But military 
victory m itself did not pay off and did not solve those underlying 
problems—the history of both postwar eras testifies to that—and often, 
military victory can weaken the victor and make the underlying problems 
worse (witness Britain and France m the aftermath of World War I)
The third change is harder to define and demonstrate, yet important 
and closely connected with the first two It is the rise in integration and 
community and the increasing reliance on consensus and law in 
international politics Along with the rise of the trading state and the decline 
of the utility of military victory, has gone a growing awareness that many 
major international problems cannot even be approached save on a broad 
international, even global level We have become increasingly aware that 
individual states, regardless of their power, cannot solve these alone—the 
environment, the law of the sea, international trade, famine and 
underdevelopment, and most of the really critical problems of peacekeeping, 
including those of the Middle East The world has grown and is growing 
together in other ways the pervasive penetration of modem 
communications, the dominance of capitalism, the increasing acceptance of 
democratic elections as a form of political legitimation for governments We 
see evidence for this trend in the integration of Western Europe, the 
eagerness of Eastern Europe to join it, the increasing usefulness of the Umted 
Nations and its agencies, and the proliferation of transnational actors m 
international politics
These three changes are, in the mam, very positive They represent 
our best chance, not merely of survival in the nuclear age, but of a more 
stable, peaceful, and just international order
4Where Do We Stand Now7
Perhaps the question should be, where does all this get us7 What do these 
assertions, some of them commonplace, some subject to serious challenge, 
have to do with the crisis and war in the Persian Gulf7
Quite a bit, actually Saddam Hussein represents, as clearly as any 
leader can, a defiant challenge to all these changes We should not demonize 
him He is only a particularly nasty specimen of the kind of power politician 
common m European politics of previous centuries and far from unknown 
m our own 4 What needs emphasis is not his ambition, lack of scruples, and 
reliance on force, these are obvious It is the fact that in his way he relies on 
these changes in international politics, uses them for his own purposes Like 
many power politicians, he despises others' scruples and inhibitions as 
weakness and exploits them as his opportunity The fact that other states and 
peoples, especially in the West, increasingly rely on the undisturbed course of 
world commerce, no longer desire or believe m military solutions, and want 
to act in community and by consensus, is what originally made him think he 
could get away with his seizure of Kuwait, just as he earlier expected to take 
advantage of Iran s revolutionary chaos to get away with his aggression there
Therefore, Saddam needs to be stopped and eventually evicted from 
Kuwait and made less dangerous Even more is at stake here than those who 
have advocated the use of force against him usually recogmze We need to 
worry not only about his dangerous example of successful aggression, his 
potential leadership in a critically unstable region with vital oil supplies and 
strategic waterways, and his likely development over time of nuclear, 
bacteriological, and chemical weapons We also should be concerned about 
the continuation rather than the reversal, of the favorable developments of 
recent decades m international politics
If, then, the common argument were true, that the only choices in our 
dealings with Saddam were negotiation or force, one would have reluctantly 
to accept the necessity of force One would also have tò face its costs squarely 
not only an uncertain but perhaps high price m lives, destruction, and 
economic and political chaos, but also a threat to the still shaky fabric of an 
emerging, better and more peaceful world order Like it or not, we necessarily 
run the risk m making war on Iraq of destroying the new emerging 
international system m order to save it
Was that our only choice—to let Saddam undermine these hopeful 
advances, or to risk ruining them ourselves, and being unwillingly dragged 
down closer to his level, by resortmg to a military solution7 Or was there 
another way to rum Saddam, or let him rum himself7
5What We Could Have Done
The question is this Did the very changes in international politics already 
mentioned—the preeminence of economics, the non-utility of military 
victory, and the increased importance of international integration, shared 
values and notions of political legitimacy, and law—offer us a way 
simultaneously to defeat Saddam and to demonstrate the effectiveness of 
these principles in action7 I think so In fact, we started out doing it, and the 
great tragedy, as so often happens in history, is that our very success in doing 
one thing caused us to overreach, trying for something different, allegedly 
better but really not as good
First, some comments on two ideas or slogans constantly used m this 
crisis victory, and the use of force By any sane definition, "victory" in 
international politics means not the destruction of the opponent's capacity to 
resist, but the achievement of one's own purposes, sensibly conceived, at a 
minimal cost to oneself, the general environment, the world, and even one s 
opponent It was said m the 18th century that the goal of international 
politics was to do as much good as possible to one s neighbor m time of peace 
and as little harm as necessary m time of war Of course, this idealistic 
conception was seldom, if ever, followed in practice, but now it has become a 
practical requirement for survival m our tight little nuclear world
Even by such a definition, victory over Saddam would require some 
use of force The claim that negotiations failed and alone were bound to fail 
is correct But a great deal depends on how one conceives of the use of force 
m international politics The administration has seemed fixed for some time 
on a concept of direct confrontation, force against force The picture evoked 
by President Bush s language (a line drawn m the desert) is that of a gunfight 
m the American West The whole procedure followed since November— 
massive reinforcements, warnings, and an ultimatum followed by the 
overwhelming application of force—confirms this image
There is a better model for the use of force where it is necessary in 
international politics judo In judo, the goal is not to exert the maximum 
force possible directly against the opponent, but to let his own use of force 
throw him off balance, and then to add just enough force of one's own to 
bring him down and disarm him
No one has ever presented his opponents with a better opportunity for 
the successful use of political judo than Saddam did last August 2 He 
invaded Kuwait and met a world reaction for which he was wholly 
unprepared I do not suppose for a moment that the United States 
government lured him into a trap by having its ambassador express its 
disinterest in his dispute with Kuwait, but had we wanted to lure him into 
one, we could not have done it better Everything he did thereafter was
6clearly improvised, an attempt to find some way to extricate himself with a 
victory, or at least without a defeat fatal to a dictator like himself
That scramble could have told us something Our goal from the 
beginning, at least our immediate one, should not have been to force Saddam 
out of Kuwait, but to pm him down there and make him stay, and by staying 
in Kuwait, gradually to undermine his armed forces, his economy, his 
position in the Middle East and the Arab world, and ultimately his rule 
Saddam's aggression presented us with a great opportunity to prove the 
preeminence of economics, the uselessness of military victory, and the 
effectiveness of world consensus and international law, in the process of 
ruining him
This was not simply a possible opening for American policy, it seemed 
for a short while to be the actual policy, and one pursued with skill and 
success Leave aside the very interesting but essentially irrelevant question of 
earlier American policy toward Iraq and Saddam and the extent to which it 
may have helped build up Saddam as a menace and contributed to the crisis 
The mam point is, as even George Bush's critics admit, that everything he did 
for the first two months was sensible and effective—putting a defensive force 
m the Gulf to prevent further Iraqi aggression, mobilizing a remarkable 
coalition of world opinion behind the American stand against Iraq, helping 
make the United Nations an effective instrument of sanctions as well as 
diplomacy, and above all putting together by far, the most airtight and 
powerful system of economic sanctions the world has ever seen
At that point Saddam was not merely stopped but trapped There was 
nothing he could do Everything he attempted did him no good or made his 
situation worse—peace with Iran at the sacrifice of the meager gams of eight 
years of war, futile appeals to other Arabs, self-defeating propaganda, empty 
threats and demonstrations, even more self-defeating seizures of hostages, 
followed by their piecemeal release m a manner that gamed Iraq nothing and 
made Saddam look ridiculous
By the same token, the United States and its allies need have done 
nothing more against Saddam We could have said with good conscience 
that much as we sympathized with the Kuwaiti regime and its people and 
condemned what Iraq had done and was doing, once the crime was done we 
could not liberate Kuwait except at a cost in death and destruction far greater 
than the suffering Kuwait had already endured Our goal was therefore, to 
insure that Iraq would not profit from its aggression ' s oil, import weapons 
and supplies, or do any of the things a would-be modem economy and 
military machine in a developing country must do to keep going The first 
objective of the United Nations, we could have said, was not to force Iraq out 
of Kuwait, whether by force, negotiations, or sanctions The first objective 
was to uphold the new emerging standards of international politics by
7exacting a suitable cost for aggression from a naked aggressor, proving to Iraq 
that so long as it clung to stolen goods, it could not sell either those goods or 
its own or buy anyone else's What Iraq chose to do about this situation was 
for Iraq itself to decide If it wished the sanctions to stop, Iraq itself would 
have to change the mind of the world community, convince it that Iraq 
deserved to come back into that community and share in its trade The first 
condition of that readmission, of course, would be that Iraq evacuate Kuwait
This would have been diplomatic and military judo Militarily, by 
mobilizing a small fraction of our forces, we would have pinned down the 
greater part of Saddam s, and robbed him of all the sources of modern 
technology and weapons while we and our allies continued to develop our 
own Fiscally, a minor expenditure of our own collective resources would 
have forced the Iraqi constantly to dram theirs, economically, the rest of the 
world would have had, as it has now, plenty of oil without Iraq's, and Iraq 
would have no revenues without the trade of the rest of the world 
Politically, we would not have placed ourselves in the position of having to 
force Saddam to retreat, thereby risking making him a hero to much of the 
Arab world because he had the courage to defy us We would have put him 
instead into the position, humiliating and dangerous to a military dictator, of 
having blundered into a trap and not knowing how to get out
Why This Would Have Worked Better than War
The first reason is that it would have been cheaper, simpler, more economical 
in resources, and more calculable War not only brings bloodshed, 
destruction, and waste, but incalculable side effects No one can tell, of course, 
what Saddam might have done in response to such a strategy, but we would 
have known what we and our allies had to do—essentially, maintain our 
position and wait—and we would have known that whatever violent act he 
might try m reply would not help him Of course it would have taken time 
for the effects of this economic blockade to cripple Iraq—perhaps a year, 
perhaps longer But the longer it took, the more compelling the lesson would 
be
Second, Saddam would, m the end, be driven out and quite possibly 
overthrown, not through force applied by a superpower, making him a hero 
to resentful Arabs for generations to come (which by many accounts is 
precisely what he wants and what may well be happening in the Arab world), 
but by his own doing The worst thing that could happen to him was that he 
be made to appear a fool before his own people This strategy would also 
have had the best chance of achieving his overthrow by the Iraqi themselves 
Economies cannot survive forever without key imports, war, even cold war, 
cannot be waged indefinitely without revenues, modem armies and air forces 
cannot sustain themselves without new weapons and parts It is notorious
8that Iraq's power was built up by first-world arms and technology, including 
some from the United States This would cut it off An army is more likely 
to follow its leader and fight m a lost cause than to let itself die on the vine in 
a futile one
Third, this would achieve exactly what we want for the international 
system—demonstrate the preeminence of economics, the futility of Saddam s 
military victory, the effectiveness of international consensus and law
Finally, this would have left the political initiative and freedom of 
maneuver in the hands of the United States and its allies, while robbing 
Saddam of it Any political or military response of his could have been met 
with further judo tactics on our part Take, for example, the most effective 
political argument he has had his claim to want justice for the Palestinians, 
and offers to evacuate Kuwait in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal from 
occupied territories or an international conference on the Palestinian 
question Our answer to this transparently hypocritical ploy has been a 
justified but clumsy and rigid rejection of linkage and insistence on 
unconditional withdrawal This has given Saddam a propaganda advantage 
in regard to questions where, as we must recognize, world opinion is as 
decisively against us as it is behind us on Kuwait
Diplomatic judo would have avoided this We could have replied to 
all Saddam s offers of a withdrawal from Kuwait, on his conditions, by 
repeating that our objective was not to persuade Saddam to leave Kuwait, but 
to establish that his aggression was unprofitable Any bribe or payment of any 
kind to Iraq for leaving Kuwait was therefore unacceptable, incompatible with 
the objective of the United Nations As for a conference on the Palestinian 
problem, we could have replied that we had long favored this in principle 
and under the right circumstances, and were willing to try to persuade the 
various parties, including Israel, to agree to one, though we could not force it 
on them Iraq's actions, however, had made one thing crystal clear so long as 
Saddam ruled Iraq, Iraq could not be permitted into any Middle Eastern 
conference, on the Palestinian question or any other Not only had he 
spawned the current threat of war by another aggression and added more 
atrocities to his earlier ones, but also during this crisis he had repeatedly and 
solemnly promised, if war broke out, to attack Israel, a bystander in this 
quarrel Such a deliberate profession of terrorism, such a total disregard of 
international law and humane standards of conduct, must disqualify Saddam 
himself, and Iraq, so long as he ruled it, from any peace conference anywhere 
A stand of this sort, pledging American support, in principle, for a conference 
on the Palestinian question, on the strict condition that Saddam Hussein and 
Iraq be excluded, would have turned Saddam's ploy to our advantage, 
isolating him further and making Palestinians and other Arabs see (insofar as 
they are accessible to evidence) that he could only hurt the Palestinian cause 
and damage those who associated with him
9Why (Supposedly) This Could Not Have Worked
Advocates of the use of force against Saddam naturally reject all this as 
wishful thinking The objections are worth considering, but when one does, 
the case for judo rather than a gunfight, sanctions as positively better and 
more effective than military force, only gets stronger
1 Sanctions did not work, they did not materially weaken Iraq s war- 
makmg capacity in five months, and could not have been expected to force 
Iraq out of Kuwait within any acceptable time frame Reply of course they 
did not achieve the final desired effect m five months, and could not be 
expected to This is like saying that a siege failed because the fortress being 
starved out could still fight after three weeks The aim of this policy would 
have been to wear Iraq down slowly over time, in that sense, the longer it 
would have taken, the better it would have worked The object lesson would 
have been not that sanctions could throw Iraq out of Kuwait, but that 
sanctions could make the price for staying in Kuwait intolerably high
2 Sanctions and diplomacy would not have changed Saddam's mind, 
he only understands force Reply True—and this is precisely why repeated 
threats of force failed to move him, and were bound to There has always 
been something strange about the administration's insistence that Saddam is 
a ruthless, power-hungry dictator, and that therefore only the threat of force 
or force itself could move him Since he is a ruthless power-hungry dictator, 
he knows that yielding to threats of force, especially from a foe he and his 
people regard as Satan, would destroy him These threats, followed by the 
actual use of force, particularly by the Umted States, have, in a certain sense, 
played into his hands, enabling him to make innocent people suffer the 
havoc his crimes have instigated, while preserving his image as a fearless 
defender of the Arab and Muslim world against the infidel We should never 
have wanted to change Saddam s mmd, we should have wanted to change 
the mmd of the Iraqis and Arabs about Saddam, by showing him up as a fool 
and a failure, a leader who committed a folly and then made his own people 
pay for it
3 Sanctions could not have been sustained long enough to do the job, 
before they could bite, the coalition would have broken up, trade with Iraq 
would have been renewed, and the West would have suffered an immense 
political defeat Reply this is constantly asserted, but somewhere those who 
claim this ought to give some evidence The sanctions remained to the end 
incomparably the most complete, effective, and universal set ever imposed 
The only perceptible strains on the coalition (m France, Germany, and some 
Arab states) emerged at the prospect that the economic sanctions and blockade 
would be turned into open war Besides, if the United States really had well- 
grounded fears of defection from the coalition, there were very effective
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measures it could have taken to maintain it, without harming or threatening 
any of our partners It could, for example, have officially declared war on Iraq, 
announcing at the same time that it would undertake no offensive action 
unless Iraq did, but merely intended to exercise its belligerent rights on the sea 
and m the air in order to maintain the blockade imposed by the United 
Nations more effectively This would put anyone proposing to trade with 
Iraq on notice that by doing so it might incur the direct enmity of the United 
States—a sobering prospect
4 The imposition of sanctions always implied the use of force if 
sanctions did not obtain results quickly If the United States and its allies had 
in effect backed down by failing to follow them up quickly with force, Saddam 
would have emerged triumphant from this test of strength between the two 
sides All the weak and vacillating regimes of the region would have leaned 
toward him, the coalition and its sanctions would gradually have collapsed, 
and the whole world would have been increasingly threatened by the 
leadership of this ruthless, power-hungry dictator over an area critical for the 
world s economy and political order
Reply This is a strange argument One would have difficulty taking it 
seriously were it not advanced by serious commentators (e g , Geoffrey Kemp 
of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) and journals (e g , The 
Economist of London in several issues in December and January 1990-91)
What the argument does is to describe fairly accurately the unfortunate 
results of the massive reinforcement of American forces in the Gulf region 
since November, and of subsequent American policy down to January 15 
These moves transformed the question by making it into a mano a mano test 
of strength between George Bush and Saddam Hussein, so that Bush as well 
as Saddam came to face unacceptable political losses if he backed down 
without a clear victory By committing itself to forcing Iraq out of Kuwait 
within a short period of time, the American government committed a critical 
blunder, laid a trap for itself and fell into it Sanctions neither implied 
further force nor required it They implied and required patience, the simple 
recognition that the longer Iraq stayed m Kuwait, the worse its situation and 
the better that of the United Nations would be
5 The American public could not have waited long enough for such a 
policy to work The American forces deployed in the Gulf had to produce 
results withm a fairly short period of time, or public pressure would have 
demanded that the boys be brought home Besides, an administration that 
tried to wait Iraq out by sanctions would soon have appeared indecisive and 
weak at home, like Jimmy Carter's in the Iranian crisis, and like his, would 
soon have been discredited and swept aside
Reply I suspect, without any sure knowledge or basis for it, that this 
was an important reason for administration policy since November
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Moreover, the political calculation involved could conceivably be correct, i e , 
it is possible that the American people in this instance would not have been 
willing to wait for results, but would have demanded that its government 
either go in and get the job done quickly, or pull out If one accepts that this 
calculation was a major reason for the current policy, and that it was backed 
by the best evidence available, then one has to say that this argument, as a 
justification of the administration's policy, is at once unworthy and 
unanswerable Unworthy in that the impatience and ignorance of the 
American public, and the unwillingness of national leaders to guide and 
educate it, constitute no defensible ground for engaging m war ourselves, 
much less pulling others into it with us, unanswerable m that one cannot 
expect politicians to jump over their own shadow, to risk political suicide 
(To be sure, one might wish for a willingness, over a great national and world 
issue, at least to risk losing the next election )
But more must be said If this was a real factor behind American policy, 
even if only one among several, we need to face squarely what this means It 
means first that as a nation we are unfit for world leadership No people so 
immature, and no political leaders so incapable of educating or leading it, can 
be entrusted with the position and power the United States now enjoys 
Second, we ought to understand what we are really saying when we give such 
a reason or excuse for American policy We say something like this "It is 
true that the United States is following a stupid and counterproductive policy, 
but you must understand the reason for this The reason, in the final 
analysis, is that we really are stupid and unreliable, and we don t want to 
learn or change "
I do not believe this Without holding a sanguine view of the 
American public's political sophistication, I think that the forty-five years of 
America's presence in Europe, forty m Korea, thirty or more in support of 
Israel, demonstrate the public's ability, sensibly led and instructed, to 
understand the central realities of international politics, gird itself for the 
long term, and wait patiently for results
The Uses of Disenchanted Loyalty
Is this not all water under the bridge7 Is it not time to close ranks 
behind the President and our armed forces after a policy has been decided by 
the democratic process and we have fully exercised our constitutional liberties 
to protest and to try to influence the decision7 Must not this kind of 
argument sow disunity and discouragement, make the situation worse7
First, an observation that while this argument has been made during 
many wars, I can think of none where it was good advice in the long run 
The best statesmen and citizens during a number of wars—World War I, the 
Crimean War, the War of 1812, most of the Napoleonic wars, and more—
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seem to me to have been those in various countries who were ready to say, 
"We may have made a mistake in getting into this war, and even if we must 
fight it now, we must think of how to limit and repair the damage '
True, recognizing the mistake does not enable one to undo it The 
citizen who believes neither, with some, that this war is just and necessary, 
nor, with others, that it is unnecessary, unjust, and imperialist, is in an 
awkward position He may regard it, as I do, as something common enough 
m history—a war more or less justified but unnecessary 5 One who sees his 
country stumble into such a war is not allowed even the psychic satisfaction 
of blaming it on particular villains in the White House, the Pentagon, Wall 
Street, or wherever, and believing that things would be better if these 
scoundrels were thrown out Nor is there comfort in the reflection that the 
bad consequences of a just, unnecessary war, even a victorious one, will be 
the same as if it were unjust, merely because it was unnecessary It is a sound 
maxim in international politics, above all m war, that nothing is more 
expensive than what is superfluous
Yet I remain convinced that there is a special value to a disenchanted 
loyalty, a disillusioned patriotism, precisely m times like this First of all, it 
should heighten the willingness and capacity of citizens to learn from the 
war, to figure out how to be smarter at international politics from here on 
Neither a jingoistic celebration of American power, nor a denunciation of 
American arrogance and war crimes are any good for that Second, and even 
more important, a disenchanted patriotism should help Americans do what 
is always most important with any war, which is not to celebrate its victory or 
denounce its stupidity and brutality or even learn how to avoid the next one, 
but to see as clearly as we can, the real consequences of this one and try to deal 
seriously with them
Whether the war is brief and glorious or prolonged and grinding, two 
things can be assumed the United States and its allies will win the war, 
which is far better than losing or allowing Saddam to win, and it will cause 
collateral damage, both economic and political, in the Middle East and 
elsewhere No one can predict what the consequences will be, but they may 
include the discovery that we, as well as Saddam, have a price to pay for 
ignoring some of the new realities of international politics
This country is likely to learn anew the long-term preeminence of 
economics over politics We already owe a high bill for having pursued 
power politics while largely ignoring our mounting deficits, failing 
educational systems, lagging competitiveness, and crumbling infrastructure 
A war in which we have continued that pursuit while others have continued 
to attend to trade will make that bill higher still
We will further discover, in various ways, the declining utility, even 
the disutility, of military victory as a real solution to long-range problems
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We are likely to experience what the leaders of successful military coalitions 
often do that those who have been rescued prove notably ungrateful, and 
those who have helped in the coalition expect the hegemonic leader to pay 
them for their services in various kinds of com A heavy bill for Israel's 
restraint has already been presented, and more will be coming It is 
impossible to see how the war can make the central problem of the region, 
the Palestinian question and the Arab-Israeli conflict, any more soluble on 
terms the United States could endorse It has deepened the chasm between 
Palestinians and Israeli, discouraged if not destroyed any inclination by even 
moderate Israel to trade land for peace, and discredited Yasir Arafat and the 
PLO as spokesmen for the Palestinians without raising any substitute in their 
place The entry into the Israeli cabinet during the war of the small Moledet 
party, whose only platform is the expulsion of Arabs from the occupied 
territories, is an ominous sign At the same time the war has raised popular 
Arab passions on the issue to new heights, imperilled moderate Arab 
governments, and focussed Arab hatreds and frustrations more directly on 
the United States instead of Israel, further weakemng and discrediting our 
government as the leader m a negotiated peace We may remember the war 
as the triumph of American and United Nations arms over despotism and 
aggression Most Arabs will remember it as one in which the superpower and 
its powerful allies destroyed a small Arab country and people trying to stand 
up for Arab rights, and many others may come to share that view more than 
ours We deal here not with questions of right or wrong, but the fact of 
selective perception
Finally, we may come to see more clearly our own need, as well as the 
world s, for international consensus and cooperation m meeting common 
problems The original coalition in favor of economic sanctions was a 
remarkable example of how cooperation can be based on an agreement on a 
common goal and a common legitimation for action It has thus far held up 
well, even m war, because a consensus on the use of force was obtained in 
advance and its limited goal, the liberation of Kuwait, so far, observed m 
practice But no such consensus exists for what to do after that goal is 
achieved, and that is when the need for it will be painfully apparent 
Opponents of the war sometimes claim that in Panama the United States 
committed an aggression as bad as Saddam's seizure of Kuwait or worse This 
is a good example of the equation of unequals, and of missing the point The 
lesson of Panama is not the evil of American imperialism, but the non-utility 
of military victory as a solution to political and economic chaos and 
upheaval, and the need for a wide consensus among all the mam participants 
in a military-political action as to what the final outcome should be More 
than a year after American forces easily occupied a small nearby country with 
which the United States had long had close ties and was familiar, most of 
whose citizens welcomed the Americans as liberators, the United States still 
has not been able to erect a stable regime and pull out This was because there 
was no agreement between us and the Panamanians, other Central
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Americans, or anyone else on the actual goal and outcome of intervention 
Iraq and the Middle East will be much worse Not only will we find it vastly 
more difficult to forge a coalition and create a consensus for peace than we 
have for war we will also find even close allies questioning why we are so 
selective m our use of force to punish aggression and end illegal occupations, 
and wondering how often we propose to draw the sword to save peace and 
build a new international order
This is in no way an argument for neo-isolatiomsm, neither is it 
Monday-morning quarterbacking or blaming America first It simply urges 
that Americans recognize now that the war we are engaging in, whether or 
not it was a mistake, will have serious consequences, that like it or not it has 
been a setback for some hopeful trends in international politics, ones we and 
others need for peace in the Middle East and elsewhere If we can face that 
possibility and talk about it soberly now, we may be better able after the war, 
without useless recrimination or gloating, to pick up the pieces and repair the 
damage, go back to promoting the rise of the trading state, the decline in the 
search for military solutions, and the quest for international consensus, 
legitimation, and legality
15
Notes
1 This essay contains many broad assertions like this with which other 
scholars may well disagree, I regret that both space and the nature of the essay 
forbid an attempt to to back them up with evidence
2 Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State (New York, 1986)
3 This represents, much oversimplified, the thrust of John Mueller s 
Retreat from Doomsday (New York, 1989), a valuable if one-sided book
4 If one wants an analogy, Hitler is not the best, Saddam cannot compare 
with him in the scope of his ambition, the power he wielded, and the 
monstrosity of his ideals But Saddam does make a pretty good Arab 
Mussolini
5 I mean "just in the sense of being waged for a justifiable end, to remedy a 
genuine evil and prevent worse evils Whether the war will also be just in 
respect to the proportionality of means to ends and the avoidance of 
unnecessary harm to innocent parties is another question
